This brief analytical commentary aims to shed light on some of the underlying developments in the war waged by the US and Israel against Iran in 2026. As forecasts are, by their very nature, subject to uncertainty, the focus is on the shifts in strategy, power dynamics and resource allocation that have been observable to date. The analysis focuses on four aspects of the war that are likely to receive less attention in live journalistic coverage. Firstly, it examines why Donald Trump’s intentions are no longer of primary importance, as the looming consequences of his actions have rendered the need to interpret his intentions obsolete. Secondly, attention is given to those currently profiting from the war, with a particular focus on the rise of AI-assisted warfare. The article concludes with a brief outline of expected medium- and long-term developments and a questioning of the US’s deterrent capability following a potential military failure or defeat in Iran.
Facts are replacing Intentions
Since the war began on 28 February 2026, experts and journalists alike have been speculating about the Trump administration’s intentions regarding the attack on Iran. To date, the US government has not clearly stated its objectives, apart from a few far-fetched explanations. This article argues that the dynamics of the war have led to a situation in which the original intentions have been overtaken by events. Trump and his administration find themselves in a stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz, and the full extent of the economic consequences has not yet reached the US market.
The United States now appears to be trapped in this situation and shows no clear willingness to bear the costly burden of naval escorts through the strait; instead, it responded with a logical, albeit belated, measure by blocking the strait itself. The stalemate in which the US remains does not appear to be resolvable through diplomatic channels, and naval escorts remain a strategic response to Iran’s control over the chokepoint that cannot be overlooked. Yet even if the United States intends to escort merchant ships, it is uncertain when it would be able to do so. In addition to the escort issue, as TWZ reported, the US had already reduced its mine-clearing capabilities in the Gulf prior to the war. This could pose a further critical challenge, as reports suggest that Iran has already laid sea mines in the strait.
The likelihood of successfully escorting tankers out of the Persian Gulf remains entirely uncertain. The tanker war of 1981 to 1988 offers only limited guidance for assessing the prospects of success. Although the United States succeeded in reflagging Kuwaiti vessels and escorting them through the Gulf, a complete ‘blockade’ or effective impassability of the Strait of Hormuz would represent an escalation surpassing anything witnessed during that period.
What seems clear at this stage is the simple fact that intentions were overtaken by the dynamics of unfolding events. In other words: when intentions are superseded by facts, control slips away. This, however, creates a paradox. At the tactical level, Operations ‘Epic Fury’ and ‘Roaring Lion’ were reportedly extremely successful: thousands of high-value targets were destroyed and leading figures of the regime eliminated, with relatively few losses of their own. Quite frankly, it is likely that the United States armed forces, together with the Israeli armed forces, possess a unique capability to conduct tactical operations on this scale.
However, tactical success and strategic success have rarely been further apart than in this war. It seems that the US and Israel can eliminate as many high-value targets as they like, yet this does nothing to alter the overall course of the conflict – which brings us back to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. One presumed intention behind the war has already been disproved: as President Trump has sought China’s support, the theory that the war was aimed at undermining China’s oil supply now seems highly unlikely.
In a sense, Donald Trump’s actions can be seen as the end of strategic politics, in which decisions can no longer be assumed to be guided by the interests of states. At the same time, his actions also reflect the unintended beginning of politics: they set in motion dynamics that lead to observable strategic decisions based on state interests, with the crucial difference that the United States is no longer at the helm of grand strategy. The ambiguity or, in some cases, sheer opacity of US intentions in this war also raises questions regarding the potential and actual beneficiaries of the war.
The Arrival of AI-Powered Warfare
When we talk about war profiteers, we can no longer simply point to the US arms industry or the fossil fuel industry. Since the launch of ‘Project Maven’ in 2017, the United States has been actively deploying artificial intelligence on a large scale in military operations. The current war in Iran could be the most significant step yet in this development, as the US is using Palantir’s Maven Smart System (MSS) to identify targets. The use of AI in warfare is drastically changing one aspect of war: speed.
Whilst identifying targets took weeks or even months during the Second World War, AI is currently capable of generating 1,000 target recommendations per hour. It is therefore not surprising that the US and Israel have hit more targets in the first 100 hours of the war than in the first six months of the US-led bombing campaign against IS. The two key players – and likely beneficiaries – in this context are Palantir and Anthropic, whose Claude AI is used by Palantir.
As the ‘MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR PENTAGON LEADERSHIP’ of 9 January 2026 clearly states, the US’s ‘dominance in artificial intelligence (AI)’ in the field of national security is to be further expanded, as President Trump expressed in Executive Order 14179. What becomes abundantly clear at this point is the need to rethink who profits from American “overseas operations”, as the categories of the past must at the very least be expanded or even redefined. The traditional beneficiaries of the arms industry or the major players in the fossil fuels sector are no longer alone. The Iran War officially marks the rise of Big Tech into the exclusive circle of US industries that profit from war.
This shift should not be underestimated. Given that a significant proportion of wars since the end of the Second World War have benefited both the arms industry and the fossil fuel industry – and that some wars were even waged for the benefit of these industries – a new member of this exclusive group is highly likely to have a massive impact on future warfare, but also on the future strategic justification for war itself. It is difficult to assess at this stage whether wars will remain an economic accelerator for AI-related companies (as is the case with the arms industry) or whether AI will develop into a resource in its own right (as is the case with the fossil fuel industry). What is certain, however, is that although AI systems were already being used by Israel prior to the current war with Iran, the present situation marks a shift in warfare – possibly forever.
Over and out? US deterrence after the failed Iran air campaign
There is no simple answer to the question of whether or not the United States is jeopardising the credibility of its military deterrent. The central point of contention here is whether military deterrence can be viewed separately from political decision-making processes. If not, it is arguably justified to accuse the current US administration of, at best, jeopardising the credibility of US deterrence or, at worst, causing it considerable harm. From a military perspective, however, this question is more complex. Although the US armed forces, particularly the Air Force, could not defeat the Iranian armed forces, especially the IRGC, there is hardly any lack of firepower. The US Air Force has demonstrated its capabilities by striking countless high-value targets in Iran. The US Navy has demonstrated its global projection capability through the deployment of its aircraft carrier strike groups, and the logistics provided by CENTCOM have underscored the US presence in the Middle East. However – and this may be a sensitive realisation for US allies on the Arabian Peninsula – the US was unable to protect the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait from Iranian attacks.
Although the US armed forces have demonstrated their capabilities and global projection capacity, they were unable to defeat the Iranian armed forces through air strikes alone. This is not surprising, however, as military experts worldwide considered a complete defeat of the Iranian regime without a ground invasion to be highly unlikely. Ultimately, this brings us back to the original question: political decision-making. It is not the US armed forces who are ultimately responsible for the current situation, but the political decision-makers, foremost among them Donald Trump. However, and with this I conclude this brief analysis, the damage has been done, and even if the US armed forces have probably lost neither their deterrent potential nor their credibility, the international community ultimately sees a world power that is incapable of defeating Iran and protecting its allies on the Arabian Peninsula. This could be the most significant consequence of the war, one that will alter the dynamics of global security in the long term.
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